American Studies in Europe or : Brother, can you paradigm ? by Kroes, Rob
 Transatlantica
Revue d’études américaines. American Studies Journal 
1 | 2001
Autour du 11 septembre
American Studies in Europe or : Brother, can you
paradigm ?
Rob Kroes
Édition électronique
URL : http://journals.openedition.org/transatlantica/327
ISSN : 1765-2766
Éditeur
AFEA
 
Référence électronique
Rob Kroes, « American Studies in Europe or : Brother, can you paradigm ? », Transatlantica [En ligne],
1 | 2001, mis en ligne le 23 mars 2006, consulté le 04 mai 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/
transatlantica/327 
Ce document a été généré automatiquement le 4 mai 2019.
Transatlantica – Revue d'études américaines est mis à disposition selon les termes de la licence
Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modiﬁcation 4.0 International.
American Studies in Europe or :
Brother, can you paradigm ?
Rob Kroes
1 “There are no borders.” Or so at least a commercial poster for Peter Stuyvesant cigarettes
in the Netherlands claimed. Never mind that smoking, particularly in the US, is seen as
transgressive behavior, as trespassing beyond borders that the ever alert prohibitionist
mind of Americans has newly drawn. The slogan, if taken metaphorically, is redolent of a
different reading of America. It conjures up an imaginary America that has stalked for
centuries  through the  European  mind.  As  John  Locke  once  famously  put  it:  “In  the
beginning, all the world was America.” Locke turned America into a metaphor for that
pristine state of human affairs where no social contract had yet imposed borders, nor
established social constraints. This view of America as the imaginary site of a primordial
freedom has always been with us since. The theme is eagerly taken up, by Americans and
non‑Americans alike, as the following advertisement may illustrate. The advertisement is
for an Italian travel agency, offering trips to Marlboro country, with the telling text: Fa il
vuoto,  Go for  the void,  for  empty space.  It  plays  on the Italian expression at  filling
stations where people order the attendant “to fill  her up.” Here it says the opposite,
playing on the post‑modern dreams of tourism as the chance to lose yourself in order to
find yourself.
2 This is by way of an introduction to the theme of my presentation today. My assigned
topic is to reflect on ways to internationalize the study of the United States, or American
Studies as  the field is  commonly known.  The concern to internationalize the field is
shared by American scholars in the field and their many colleagues in non‑American
settings. But as I will argue, they act on different intellectual and existential cues. In
other words, American Studies scholars outside the United States may have a specific
contribution to make when it comes to internationalizing the framework of American
Studies. I shall focus on that particular contribution, after giving a brief sketch of what
our American colleagues have independently come up with. It we put the matter in terms
of changing the prevailing paradigm of American Studies, the question for non‑American
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scholars  in  the  field  then  becomes  one  that  we  may  phrase  as:  Brother,  can  you
paradigm?
Internationalizing American Studies
3 The internationalization of American Studies can mean various things. It is a buzzword
that pops up in various contexts. There used to be broad agreement that the object of
American Studies was the history, society and culture of a geo‑political entity that we
know as the United States, but which is commonly referred to by its own citizens and
outsiders as America.  As recent trends in American Studies make clear,  the object of
study needs being internationalized, and so do the scholarly approaches to it. A further
goal of internationalization appears to be the greater interaction among the worldwide
constituency of American Studies scholars.
4 Internationalizing  the  object  of  study  means  redefining  it,  taking  it  away  from  its
nation‑state frame of perception and interpretation, if not from the national emphasis in
the narratives that it spawned. Even when the object of study—the United States—was
taken  to  exceptionalist  extremes,  though,  there  was  always  a  tacit  comparative
dimension.  America could only be conceived as  an exception when one assumes the
existence of a rule to which the rest of the world is deemed subject. Yet precisely for
being exceptional the story had to be told separately, in relative insulation from forces of
history at work elsewhere. If the implicit comparitive dimension adds one touch of irony
to  the  exceptionalist  view,  further  irony  lies  in  the  fact  that  non‑Americans  have
contributed strongly to the exceptionalist reading of America’s historical experience.
5 Now,  increasingly,  the  need  is  felt  to  see  America  as  presenting  specific  historical
configurations of forces that affect the United States as much as other parts of the world.
Histories of slavery and the slave trade, of migration and diasporic communities, of the
settlement of the Western hemishere, of industrialization and urbanization and the social
movements  that  attended  these  massive  transformations,  studies  of  class,  race  and
gender, they all squarely place the United States within a transnational and comparative
perspective. Relatively straightforward as this program for research may appear, it has
become clear recently that two clashing paradigms are vying for the meaningful recasting
of the study of the United States.
6 One—let  us  call  it  the  Thelen  approach—aims  at  exploding  the  very  context  of  the
nation‑state as the central structuring element in historical narratives. As Thelen himself
put it in the introduction to a special issue of the Journal of American History,  devoted
entirely  to  transnational  perspectives  on  United  States  history:  “Since  it  seemed
increasingly strange that history had centered its concern with time and place on the
nation‑state, we wanted to design a special issue that would interrogate, not assume, the
centrality of the nation‑state as the organizing theme for American history. We wanted to
explore how people and ideas and institutions and cultures moved above, below, through,
and around, as well as within, the nation‑state, to investigate how well national borders
contained or explained how people experienced history.”1 The second direction in which
to take the project of internationalizing the study of the United States—let us call this the
Rodgers paradigm—is one that would conceive of the United States as just another nation
among  nations,  without  any  messianic  destiny  or  exceptionalist  aspiration.  It  is  an
approach that, unlike the Thelen paradigm, re‑emphasizes the nation‑state character of
the United States, and proposes to present a non‑ (or post‑) exceptionalist history of the
United States, as a country whose history is contingent upon larger historical forces and
connected to the impact of and response to those forces in other nation‑states.2
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7 I would suggest there is a third way to internationalize the study of the United States, one
that  ironically  re‑introduces  an  exceptionalist  element.  If  in  much  recent  work  the
United States as an object of study has lost its national boundedness, this has also been
the result of scholarly approaches that look at America as inherently an international
phenomenon. Studies of the way in which the country, in the course of what became
known as the American Century, has projected itself as a force affecting the lives of many
people across the globe, are inherently international. They explore the ways in which
America’s power,  political,  military,  economic,  and cultural,  is  experienced and made
sense of elsewhere. Many Americas arose in the process, as so many constructions in the
minds of people elsewhere trying to make sense of the forces that changed their lives. If
those forces today are often subsumed under the catch‑all  word of globalization,  the
problem  for  research  is  to  try  and  discern  the  American  agency  affecting  them.
Globalization and Americanization are not identical, although they are intertwined. In
addition to American agency,  though,  there are the further  and crucial  questions of
mediation and reception, questions to do with the manifold ways in which people at the
receiving end recontextualize American culture as it reaches them. There is a freedom
involved in cultural reception which may make us aware of the agency implied in the
process  of  reception.  If  America  as  an  imaginary  entity  results  from  a  cultural
construction going on all over the globe, that America (or those Americas) in particular
constitute what I called the inherently international object of study for American Studies
scholars. The exceptionalist moment in this approach lies in the structural imbalance
between America’s position as a semiotic center relegating all other nation‑states to the
position of receivers.
8 This third way of internationalizing American Studies may help to take away the United
States as an object of study from the control of American scholars as the intellectual
community  predominantly  in  charge  of  the  agenda  of  American  Studies.  Too  long
scholars studying America from abroad have led lives of derivation, at an intellectual
periphery that took its cues from a center situated in the United States. Working at the
margins their work remained relatively obscure in the center, nor was it noticed much
among fellow scholars at the periphery elsewhere. The collective gaze from scholars at
the  periphery  for  too  long  centered  on  America.  Many  recent  endeavors  in
internationalizing  American  Studies  aimed  precisely  at  bringing  scholars  from these
various margins together, trying to create a sense of community among them, and an
awareness of sharing concerns and research interests that did not naturally arise at the
center.
9 In  the  following,  by  way  of  a  case  study,  I  propose  to  explore  an  area  of  research
questions that are inherently international, yet all relate to America as a central force in
our present‑day world.  Forces of  globalization have allowed America to project  itself
more forcefully across the world than any other contemporary nation. In the process it
has planted the many emblems of its world‑wide presence across the globe, emblems that
may evoke cultural resistance or serve as carriers of American culture. My focus will be
on forms of American commercial culture, particularly advertising.
Cultural Imperialism and the Freedom of Reception
10 Students  of  Americanization  are  in  general  agreement  as  regards  the  semantic
transformations that attend the dissemination of American cultural messages across the
world. Depending on their precise angle and perspective some rather tend to emphasize
in their  explorations  the cultural  strategies  and auspices  behind the transmission of
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American culture. Whether they study Buffalo Bill’s Wild West Show when it traveled in
Europe,  Hollywood  movies,  or  World  Fairs,  to  name  just a  few  carriers  for  the
transmission of  American culture,  their focus is  rather on the motifs  and organizing
views that the producers were trying to convey rather than on the analysis of what the
spectators and visitors did with the messages they were exposed to. All such cultural
productions  taken  as  representations  of  organizing  world  views  do  tend  to  lead
researchers to focus on senders rather than receivers of  messages.  Yet,  given such a
focus, it hardly ever leads these researchers to look at the process of reception as merely
one of passive imbibing. Whatever the words one uses to describe what happens at the
point of reception, words such as hybridization or creolization, current views agree on a
freedom  of  reception,  a  freedom  to  re‑semanticize  and  re‑contextualize  meaningful
messages reaching audiences across national and cultural borders. Much creativity and
inventiveness goes into the process of reception, much joy and exhilaration springs from
it. Yet making this the whole story would be as fallacious as a focus centered solely on the
schemes  and  designs  of  the  senders  of  messages.  Whatever  their  precise  angle,
researchers agree on the need to preserve balance in their  approach to problems of
Americanization.
11 Furthermore, some researchers, like e.g. Robert W. Rydell in a contribution to the 1998
Lisbon conference of the European Association for American Studies,3 tend to conceive of
Americanization as a process tied to an early American economic expansionism, or, more
recently, to an emerging global economy structured by the organizing logic of corporate
capitalism, still very much proceeding under American auspices. The main area in which
Rydell  sees  Americanization  at  work  is  in  the  “commodification  of  culture  which
colonizes the leisure time of people worldwide.” World Fairs and other transmitters of
America’s  commercial  culture  conjure  up  a  “veritable  ‘dream  world’  of  mass
consumption,  a  simulation  through  spectacle  of  the  good  life  afforded  by  the
technological  advances  associated  with  modernization.”4 He  goes  on to  contrast  this
simulacrum of the good life with the ravages wrought by corporate capitalism in many
parts of the globe. He explicitly wants to keep the concept of Americanization in our
critical lexicon as a useful reminder of what American economic expansionism has meant
in terms of advancing the interests of American corporate culture overseas.
12 I  am  not  so  sure  whether  this  is  the  right  tack.  Rydell  seems  unduly  to  read  the
autonomous  rise  of  global  corporate  capitalism  as  due  to  American  agency.  It  is  a
common fallacy in much of the critique of Americanization to blame America for trends
and developments that would have occurred anyway, even in the absence of America.
From Marx, via Hobson and Lenin, all the way to the work of the Frankfurt School, there
is a long line of critical analysis of capitalism and imperialism, highlighting its inner
expansionist logic. Surely, in our century, much of this expansion has proceeded under
American auspices, receiving an American imprint, in much the same way that a century
ago, the imprint was British. The imprint has often confused critics into arguing that the
havoc wreaked by an over‑arching process of modernization, ranging from the impact of
capitalism to processes of democratization of the political arena or the rise of a culture of
consumption, were truly the dismal effects of America upon their various countries. From
this perspective the critique of Americanization is too broad, exaggerating America’s role
in areas  where in fact  it  was caught  up in historic transformations much like other
countries were.
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13 From a  different  perspective,  though,  this  view of  Americanization is  too narrow.  It
ignores those vast areas where America, as a construct, an image, a phantasma, did play a
role in the intellectual and cultural life of people outside its national borders. There is a
repertoire of fantasies about America that even predates its discovery. Ever since, the
repertoire  has  been  fed  in  numerous  ways,  through  many  media  of  transmission.
Americans and non‑Americans have all contributed to this collective endeavor, making
sense of the new country and its evolving culture. Especially in our century America has
become ever more present in the minds of non‑Americans, as a point of reference, a
yardstick, a counterpoint. In intellectual reflections on the course and destiny of their
countries and cultures America became part of a process of triangulation, serving as a
model for rejection or emulation, providing views of a future seen in either a negative or
a positive light. America has become a tertium comparationis in culture wars elsewhere,
centering on control of the discourse concerning the national identity and the national
culture. When America was typically rejected by one party in such contests, the other
party saw it as a liberating alternative. Writing the history of such receptions of America
is as much American Studies as it is an endeavor in the intellectual history of countries
other  than  the  United  States.  It  also  should  form  part  of  a  larger  reflection  upon
processes summarily described as Americanization.
14 Undeniably,  though,  in the course of  this  allegedly “American Century” America has
assumed a centrality that one might rightly call imperial. Like Rome in the days of the
Roman empire, it has become the center of webs of control and communication that span
the  world.  Its  cultural  products  reach  the  far  corners  of  the  world,  communicating
American ways and views to people elsewhere, while America itself remains relatively
unaware of cultural products originating outside its national borders. If for such reasons
we might call America’s reach imperial, it is so in a number of ways. It is imperial in the
economic sphere, in the political sphere, and in the cultural sphere. If it is still possible to
use the word in a relatively neutral way, describing a factual configuration rather than
the outcome of concerted effort and motive, we might speak of an American imperialism,
of its economic imperialism, political imperialism, and cultural imperialism. Trying to
accommodate  themselves  to  their  diminished role  and place  in  the  world,  European
countries have at times opted to resist particular forms of America’s imperial presence.
Thus, taking France as the most telling case, it chose to resist political imperialism by
ordering NATO out of the country, it warned against America’s economic imperialism
through Jean Jacques Servan‑Schreiber’s Le défi américain, it briefly considered preventing
Jurassic  Park from being released in  France,  seeing it  as  a  case of  American cultural
imperialism and a threat to the French cultural identity.
15 Yet,  suggestive as the terms are of neat partition and distinction, the three forms of
imperialism do in fact overlap to a large extent. Thus, America in its role as the new
political hegemon in the Western world, could restructure markets and patterns of trade,
through  the  Marshall  Plan,  which  guaranteed  access  to  the  European  markets  for
American  products.  Political  imperialism  could  thus  promote  economic  imperialism.
Opening European markets for American commerce also meant preserving access for
American  cultural  exports,  such  as  Hollywood  movies.  Economic  imperialism  thus
translated into cultural imperialism. Reversely, as carriers of an American version of the
“good life,”  American products,  from cars to movies,  from clothing styles to kitchen
apparel,  all  actively  doubled  as  agents  of  American  cultural  diplomacy.  Thus,  trade
translated back into political imperialism. And so on, in endless feedback loops.
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16 In my own work of recent years I have chosen to focus on the cultural dimension in all
these  various  forms  of  an  American  imperial  presence.  American  culture,  seen  as  a
configuration of ways and means that Americans use for expressing their collective sense
of  themselves—their  Americanness—is  mediated  through  every  form  of  American
presence abroad.  From the high rhetoric of  its  political  ideals  to the golden glow of
McDonald’s  arches,  from Bruce  Springsteen  to  the  Marlboro  Man,  American  culture
washes across the globe. It does so mostly in disentangled bits and pieces, for others to
recognize and pick up, and re‑arrange into a setting expressive of their own individual
identities, or identities they share with peer groups. Thus, teenagers may have adorned
their own bedrooms with the iconic faces of Hollywood or rock music stars in order to
provide themselves with a most private place for reverie and games of identification, they
have also been engaged in a construction of private worlds that they share with countless
others. In the process they re‑contextualize and re‑semanticize American culture to make
it function within expressive settings entirely of their own making.
17 In his contribution to the Lisbon conference Bob Rydell referred to W.T. Stead, an early
British observer of Americanization as “the trend of the Twentieth Century.” As Rydell
makes  clear,  Stead  saw  Americanization  mostly  as  the  world‑wide  dissemination  of
material goods, as so many signs of an American technical and entrepreneurial prowess.
It would be for later observers to look at these consumer goods as cultural signifiers as
well,  as carriers of  an American way of  life.  An early example of  an observer of  the
American scene with precisely this ability to read cultural significance into the products
of a technical civilization was the Dutch historian Johan Huizinga. In his collection of
travel observations, published after his only trip to the United States in 1926,5 he showed
an  uncanny  awareness  of  the  re‑cycling  of  the  American  Dream  into  strategies  of
commercial persuasion, linking a fictitious world of self‑fulfillment—a world where every
dream would come true—to goods sold in the market. High‑minded aesthete though he
was, forever longing for the lost world of late‑medieval Europe, he could walk the streets
of the great American cities with an open eye for the doubling of American reality into a
seductive simulacrum. He was inquisitive enough to ask the right questions, questions
that still echo in current research concerning the reception of mass culture in general,
and of commercial exhortations in particular. He wondered what the effect would be on
everyday people of the constant barrage of commercial constructions of the good life.
“The public constantly sees a model of refinement far beyond its purse, ken and heart.
Does it imitate this? Does it adapt itself to this?” Apposite questions indeed. Huizinga is
aware of the problem of reception of the virtual worlds constantly spewed forth by a
relentless commercial mass culture. More generally, in these musings, Huizinga touched
on the problem of the effect that media of cultural transmission, like film and advertising,
would have on audiences not just in America but elsewhere as well. In these more general
terms,  the problem then becomes one of  the way in which non‑American audiences
would read the phantasy worlds that an American imagination had produced and which
showed all the characteristics of an American way with culture so vehemently indicted by
European critics.
18 In  the  following I  propose  to  explore  a  few ways  in  which we might  reflect  on the
intricate ways in which, in the post‑World War II period, American mass culture, reaching
a Europe that more than ever before had come within America’s imperial sway, may have
affected European cultures. My focus will be on advertising, seen as a peculiar blend of
economic and cultural imperialism.
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Advertising: The Commodification of American Icons
19 A nation that stops representing itself in images stops being a nation. It is doomed to lead
a life of derivation, vicariously enjoying worlds of imagery and imagination imported
from abroad. Or so President Mitterrand was reported to have been musing. In a mood of
cultural  protectionism,  against  the backdrop of  a  seemingly unstoppable conquest  of
Europe’s cultural space by American images, Mitterrand’s France called for—but failed to
get—a clause exempting cultural goods from the free‑trade logic of GATT. The episode, in
the final negotiating stages of the Uruguay Round, is reminiscent of earlier defensive
ploys by France in the face of a threat of Americanization. There is the story, as told by
more than one author,6 of the fight that France chose to pick to keep Coca‑Cola out of the
country. Coca‑Cola became the symbol of everything that a certain intellectual discourse
in  Europe  had  always  rejected  in  America,  as  the  country  that  had  succeeded  in
mass‑marketing bad taste.  If  there was much to be envied in America as a model  of
modernity, it offered an example that France should be following selectively and on its
own terms—under strict  “parental  guidance,” so to speak.  Yet the example as set by
America was tempting,  precisely  because it  undercut  parental  authority  and cultural
guardianship, promising the instant gratification of desire rather than its sublimation,
consumption rather than consummation. Coca‑Cola was the item that the French chose to
symbolize this pernicious pleasure principle in the global transmission of American mass
culture. The soft drink, in this French campaign, was turned into an icon of an alleged
American  strategy  of  cultural  imperialism.  It  also  gave  the  strategy  a  name:
Coca‑Colonization.
20 More recently, another soft‑drink commercial,  for Seven Up, illustrated the seductive
semiotics that underlies so many of the messages that reach us from across the Atlantic
Ocean. It did this without drawing on the repertoire of American icons. There was no
Marlboro Man roaming the open space of an American West, no Castle Rock, no Statue of
Liberty. Instead it introduced a streetwise little brat, a cartoon character by the name of
Fido  Dido  (If  I  do,  they  do?).  Only  few among the  European  audience  watching  the
commercial would have been aware of its American auspices. As it happened, however,
the cartoon character was American, and so was the commercial itself. Yet, to all intents
and purposes, it could have been produced by advertising agencies anywhere. The only
clearly American referent in the commercial was the product it tried to promote, a soft
drink that saw its market share slipping and felt in need of a new image.
21 In the first instalment of what turned out to be a little series of narrations centering on
Fido Dido, we see him meeting the hand of his maker. Briefly it may seem like a lighter,
cartoon version of the scene in the Sistine Chapel where a drowsy Adam, touching fingers
with  God,  is  brought  to  life.  But  Fido  Dido’s  meeting  is  of  a  different  kind.  His
confrontation is with parental authority, with the commanding hand of social propriety.
The hand of the maker, “in living color,” holds a pencil and gets ready to retouch Fido
Dido. First his unkempt hair gets neatly combed and partitioned. Fido Dido indignantly
shakes his hair back into its previous state. The pencil continues the attack and dresses
Fido Dido in jacket and tie. It moves on to the object in Fido Dido’s right hand, also in full
color, as real as the hand and pencil: the can of Seven Up. The pencil tries to erase it, yet
the  can  is  beyond such  manipulation.  Fido  Dido  meanwhile  has  moved  towards  full
rebellion. Jacket and tie have already been thrown off; a well‑aimed kick hits the pencil.
Its tip breaks and hangs limply—a fitting symbol of parental impotence. Victoriously Fido
Dido walks off the screen. In final retaliation his yo‑yo now hits the pencil. The broken
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point falls off. His victory prize is a taste of the elixir of freedom: cool, sparkling Seven
Up. The semiotics all merge into one message: a simple soft drink has been turned into a
symbol of freedom. Much as the product,  as well  as the commercial and the cartoon
character itself, may be American, the message is understood internationally.
22 We may see in this one example the end stage of a process of internationalization and
generalization—decontextualization, if one wishes—of a sales pitch that was developed in
America and, in its earlier stages, relied on much more explicit American iconography.
We mentioned the Marlboro Man as a contemporary case of strong American symbolism
—the West as open space, a realm of freedom—used to connect the sense of freedom, of
being one’s own man, to a simple item of merchandise like a cigarette. Yet the Marlboro
Man is only a recent version of the commodification of American symbols of freedom that
as a process has gone on for over a century. America as empty space, the epic America of
the frontier, America as a mythical West, had long before the consumption revolution
been turned into a symbol of freedom. The West as a beckoning yonder had kept alive the
dream, in far‑away corners of Europe, of a life lived in freedom and independence. As the
promise of a new world and a new era, it could vie with contemporary utopian views
offered by Marxism or similar emancipation movements. Posters, produced for shipping
lines, emigration societies, and land development agencies, contributed their imagery to
the continuing construction of America as the very site of freedom and space. To many
such imagery must  have represented the  promise  of  freedom and escape offered by
America.
Photograph by the author 7
23 If such is the central appeal of “America” as an image, we need not be surprised at the
craving for material that could visualize the image. Chromo lithographs, photographs,
stereographs and their suggestion of three‑dimensionality, all tried to still this hunger.
They allowed people to move beyond the limited horizons of their daily lives and to enter
into an imaginary space, a fantasy world. They offered reality and illusion at the same
time.
24 Nor need we be surprised that such pictures soon were turned into advertising tools.
When images of the West, or rather: of America as one huge space, could trigger fantasies
of  fulfillment  and  liberty,  common  merchandise  might  hope  to  benefit  from  an
association with such images. Today everyone is familiar with the West as “Marlboro
Country,” with the successful marriage of a cigarette brand with the Marlboro Man. But
as early as a century ago advertisements tried to bring about this union. A colorful 1860
poster  advertises  the  Washoe  Brand of  the  Christian and Lee  Tobacco Company from
Richmond, Virginia. No tobacco leaf, cigar, or pipe in sight. What we do see are images of
the West—Western horsemen, far horizons—grouped around a medallion that shows us a
picture of the Goddess Columbia draped in the American flag, an eagle, a globe with the
Western hemisphere turned forward,  and a pot  brimming with gold coins.  The West
appears as a vision of plenty. Another poster, from the same period, advertises Westward
Ho Smoking Tobacco. Its very name ties the tobacco to the beckoning call of the West. Yet
the producer, G.W. Langhorne and Co., from Lynchburg, Virginia, did not leave it at that.
The poster shows us an allegorical female figure, a version of Columbia with stark Indian
features, feathers in her hair, her extended hand holding forth a calumet, her body, save
her breasts, wrapped in the Stars and Stripes. This is not Europa abducted by Jupiter, this
is America, impetuously galloping forth on elk‑back: “Westward Ho!” indeed.
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25 Apparently,  well  before  the  decade  of  the  “roaring  twenties,”  commerce  had
appropriated the allegorical  repertoire of  the American dream. The images that  now
flooded across  the country through techniques of  mechanical  reproduction,  could be
endlessly re‑arranged to render new symbolic messages. The West as a realm for the
imagination could connect with the world of trite consumption goods such as tobacco or
cigarettes. Advertising developed into an art of symbolic alchemy that has continued to
retain its potency. The symbolic connection that advertisers sought to establish hinged
on the concept of “freedom.” This linking of evocative images of American freedom and
space  tended  to  work  best  with  leisure  time  articles,  such  as  cigarettes,  beer,  an
automobile  or  a  motorbike,  a  pair  of  blue  jeans.  Consumption,  leisure  time,  and
“freedom”  thus  became  inextricably  interwoven.  And  even  today  “America”  can  be
counted on to trigger  an association with freedom.  The iconography of  America has
become international. Italian jeans manufacturers now advertise their wares in Germany
on posters depicting Monument Valley. The German cigarette brand West mounted an
international  advertising  campaign  whose  central  metaphors  revolve  around  the
American West. The Dutch non‑alcohol beer Stender used the imaginary West of American
road‑movies for its television commercials, including brief encounters at gas stations in
an empty West, an exchange of glances between the sexes, the half‑inviting, half‑ironic
sizing up, the beginning of erotic tension. The release of tension occurs, surprisingly,
when he or she, in gleaming black leather, irrespective of gender, in the true macho style
of the West, flips the top of a bottle of Stender and takes off again on a shiny motorbike,
into the empty distance.
26 America’s  national  symbols  and  myths  have  been  translated  into  an  international
iconographic language, a visual lingua franca. They have been turned into free‑floating
signifiers, internationally understood, free for everyone to use. Yet it is only a replay, on
an international scale, of what had previously occurred in the United States. Given the
characteristic  American  bent  for  dis‑assembling  whatever  presents  itself  as  an
organically coherent whole, only to re‑assemble it differently, this American leadership
role need not surprise us. In their production of commercial messages this same cultural
bent has been at work, removing symbols from their historical context and re‑arranging
them  into  novel  configurations.  The  appropriate  metaphor  may  be  that  of
Lego‑construction, which uses the individual pieces as just so many “empty signifiers,”
combining them into ever‑changing meaningful structures. Commerce and advertising
are but one area where we can see these rituals of cultural transformation at work. For
indeed,  consumption  goods  as  well  can  freely  change  their  meaning,  appearing  in
ever‑changing  configurations,  furnishing  a  realm  of  virtual  reality,  turning  into
simulacra at the hands of the wizards of advertising. They become true phantasmas set
free by the human imagination.
27 No bastion of  conventional  order  is  immune to  this  erosive  freedom.  In  the area  of
advertising as well  as in other areas of cultural production we can discern a moving
American frontier,  affecting an ever‑increasing number of social  conventions with its
“deconstructing”  logic.  Recent shifts  in  this  frontier  have  affected  the  established
constructions  of  gender,  re‑arranging  at  will  reigning  views  of  what  constitutes  the
typically male and female, the masculine and feminine. “Genderbending” is the word that
American  English  has  invented  for  describing  this  process.  Pop  culture  heroes  like
Michael Jackson, Grace Jones, or Madonna, project invented personae that are strangely
androgynous. Hollywood is busy bending gender in films like Alien II, where the enemy
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computer is called Mother and the heroine copes as if she were a man. Commercials like
those for Stender also play on the repertoire of accepted gender definitions.  The best
recent example is  a television commercial  for Levi’s  501.  A young,  chocolate‑skinned
woman, invitingly dressed, her midriff bare, is shown taking a New York cab. While the
driver is ogling her in his rear‑view mirror, his lips moving a toothpick back and forth,
suggestively, as if engaged in a mating ritual, she coolly adds a few final touches to her
make‑up. But then the tables are turned. What gives the driver a start and brings his cab
to a full stop, is the sound of an electric razor and the sight of his passenger shaving. The
last shot is of the passenger walking away, the victor in another battle of the sexes, the
Levi’s as snug and inviting as ever. As the text reminds us, in case we didn’t know already:
“Cut for Men Since 1850.” Thus, in all these cases, an entire new area has opened up for
fantasies of freedom to roam.
28 There  may  be  a  cultural  “deep  structure”  underlying  such  developments  that  is
characteristically American, yet our point is that the appeal of such cultural bricolage is
international. Even in the absence of clearly American markers, as in the case of our Fido
Dido commercial, the underlying logic of recombination, tying “freedom” to a soft drink,
is  American.  The  appeal,  though,  is  worldwide.  In  that  sense  we  have  all  become
Americanized.  We  have  grown  accustomed  to  a  specific  American  mode  of  cultural
production, or rather to the ways in which American culture reproduces itself, through
endless variation and recombination. Not only have we cracked American cultural codes
and can we read them flawlessly,  we have also appropriated these codes.  They have
become part of our collective imaginary repertoire.
29 One illustration will make an additional point. In the spring of 1994, on walls all over
Italy, there were posters displaying a scene taken from the history of the conquest of the
West.
Photograph by the author
30 We see a covered wagon in what is clearly a Western landscape, dry and desolate. A few
men gather  together  in  front  of  the  wagon.  The scene is  one of  relative  relaxation.
Clearly, the day’s work has been done. The poster’s color is sepia, suggesting a reprint of
an old photograph. The legend informs us that Vendiamo un’ autentica leggenda—We sell an
authentic legend. Clearly a variation on Coca‑Cola’s claim of being “the real thing,” the
viewer is left wondering what the authentic legend might be. Is it the Levi’s blue jeans?
The answer must be yes. Is it the American West? Again: the answer is yes. A commodity,
a piece of merchandise as down‑to‑earth as a pair of workingman’s trousers, has become
a myth, while the West as a myth has become commodified. And Levi’s, as the poster
honestly tells us, sells it. Yet there is more to this poster. There is an ironic sous‑entendu,
an implied wink to the audience. After all, the audience has long since got the message.
They know that Levi’s is a myth and they know what the myth represents. It represents
more than the West, it represents their own collective memory of growing up in a Europe
filled with American ingredients. Generation upon generation of Europeans, growing up
after the war, can all tell their own story of a mythical America as they constructed it,
drawing on American advertisements, songs, films, and so on. Ironically, these collective
memories—these  imagined  Americas  where  people  actually  spent  part  of  their  past
growing up—are now being commodified: to all those who on the basis of Jack Kerouac
and a pop song remember Route 66 without ever having crossed the Atlantic, a Dutch
travel agency now offers nostalgic trips down that artery. The road may no longer exist, it
re‑occurs as a replica of itself, a simulacrum in the great Disney tradition.
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31 The point is clear: generation upon generation of Europeans have grown up, constructing
meaningful  worlds  that  they  shared  with  their  peers  and  which  crucially  drew  on
American ingredients. Mythical “Americas” have become part and parcel of the collective
memory of Europeans. This takes us back to Mitterrand’s musings. It seems as if he has
fallen victim to a misreading of the way the collective memory of Europeans was built in
the post‑war period. Why indeed must a collective memory be a matter of, as Mitterrand
has it, a country depicting itself in images? Why not admit that the collective memory of
national populations is crucially a matter of the appropriation and digestion of foreign
influences? One could ignore these only at the peril of centrally imposing definitions of
what constitutes the nation. And in fact many of the arguments in favor of the cultural
exemption clause,  protecting national  cultural  identities,  seem to betray this  narrow
paternalist view of the nation and its identity.
32 Commercial messages have been only one of the transmission belts of American culture
abroad.  Modern  media  of  mass  reproduction  and  mass  distribution,  like  film,
photography, the press, radio, television, sound recordings, have filled the semiotic space
of people everywhere with messages made in America. Americans themselves, through
their physical presence abroad, in the form of expatriate colonies, of armies, of business
men,  have  equally  contributed  to  the  worldwide  dissemination  of  their  culture.  Yet
commercial messages, in the way they transmit American culture, are a particular case.
They are not simply neutral carriers, conveying American culture for others to consume
and  enjoy,  but  give  a  particular  twist  to  whatever  ingredients  of  the  American
imagination they use. A recent illustration of this process can be seen in a commercial
message broadcast  by  CNN,  the  worldwide cable  news network,  and paid  for  by  the
“Advertising Council” in London. In what is in fact an advertisement for advertising, the
point is made that without advertising we all would be worse off, getting less information
through the media, whether the press or the electronic media. Advertising is presented as
a necessary prop for the continued existence of a well‑informed public in a functioning
democracy.  The little civics lesson, offered by this commercial,  ends with the slogan:
“Advertising—The Right to Choose.”
33 This  blending of  the  rationale  of  capitalism and democratic  theory is  not  new.  It  is
reminiscent  of  what  happened  in  the  early  1940s  in  America.  Then,  on  the  eve  of
America’s  participation in  World  War  II,  President  F.D.  Roosevelt  made his  powerful
contribution to American public discourse in his “Four Freedoms Speech,” a rallying cry
in which he called on his countrymen to fulfill an American world mission as he saw it. In
all likelihood he had picked up the Four Freedoms as a rhetorical figure in the public
domain. The Four Freedoms, as a group of four statues erected along the main concourse
of the New York World Fair of 1939/40, had already left their imprint on the millions of
visitors to the fair. Working on his final draft of the State of the Union Address, Roosevelt
briefly toyed with the idea of Five Freedoms, but clearly he did not want to move away
from the popular foursome at the Fair. If he wished his words to reverberate among the
larger public, he needed to draw on a popular repertoire that was already established.
The link with political views among the larger public was further reinforced through
Norman  Rockwell’s  series  of  four  oil  paintings,  made  after  Roosevelt’s  speech,  each
representing one of the four freedoms. Using his appeal as an artist who had succeeded in
rendering a romantic,  small‑town view of life cherished by millions of Americans,  he
managed to give the same endearing touch to Roosevelt’s message. Through the mass
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distribution of reproductions, Rockwell’s paintings of the Four Freedoms facilitated the
translation and transfer of Roosevelt’s high‑minded call to a mass audience.
34 If this is an illustration of American political culture as an element of American mass
culture, of political rhetoric as it emanates from the public domain and returns to it, it
was unaffected by the rationale of business. If anything had to be sold at all, it was a
matter of political  ideas;  if  a sales pitch was needed at all,  it  was a matter of public
suasion, explaining the world to the larger democratic public and calling upon it to take
appropriate action. Yet it was not long before Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms would be joined
by a Fifth, in an advertisement by the Hoover Vacuum Cleaner Company in a 1944 issue of
the Saturday Evening Post. It was an illustrated ad in the style of Norman Rockwell. We
recognize the setting, the faces are familiar. An old woman, a middle‑aged man, and a
young girl—“people from the neighborhood.” They look upward towards a beam of light;
providence, if not the good provider, is smiling upon them. In their arms they hold an
abundance of packages, all of them gift‑wrapped. This is Norman Rockwell country. With
a  difference,  though:  Rockwell’s  mythical  small‑town  people,  carriers  of  democratic
virtue, now appear in the guise of Americans as consumers. Three years after Roosevelt
decided that there were four, not five, freedoms, the Hoover advertisement reminded
Americans that “the Fifth Freedom is Freedom of Choice.” If  America had joined the
struggle to safeguard democratic values, this implied safeguarding the freedom of choice.
By a simple semantic sleight of  hand,  the (con)text of  the advertisement shifted the
meaning of freedom of choice: the “signified” was no longer the realm of politics, but the
freedom of  choice  of  the  citizen  in  his  role  as  consumer.  Thus  spheres  of  freedom
smoothly shaded into one another.
35 And they still do. The Hoover Company may have chosen to use language popular at the
time, and to speak of a Freedom. The CNN message is cast in the language of rights,
reminding us of our Right to Choose (again playing on the political ring that the phrase
currently has). In either case what we see happening is the commodification of political
discourse. The language of political ideals, of rights and freedoms, is being highjacked in
order to dress purposeful  commercial  action in stolen clothes.  Whether dressed as a
freedom or a right,  a commodifying logic appears in pure form, unconnected to any
particular product. Yet it is a logic we met before in particular cases, which tied the
promise  of  freedom to  cigarettes  or  soft  drinks.  It  is  a  logic  that  commodifies,  and
pedestrianizes,  political  ideals  by  putting  them  in  the  service  of  commercial
salesmanship. In that sense, we seem to have struck upon just another instance of the
vulgarizing  impact  of  American  culture,  corroborating  a  point  made  by  so  many
European critics of American mass culture.
36 Yet this is not the whole story. The very slogans chosen by sales departments, affirming
our “Freedom of Choice,” or our “Right to Choose,” are semantically unstable and may
well convey a message different from that the salesmen had in mind. A word like choice,
when left  unspecified,  sits  uneasily  astride  the  divide  between the  political  and  the
economic spheres. “Freedom of Choice” in particular may well read as the “Choice of
Freedom,”  a  simple  inversion that  may well  put  political  ideas  into the heads  of  an
audience  that  is  addressed  in  its  role  as  consumers.  Paradoxically,  then,  advertising
stratagems cooked up by commercial sponsors may well have the effect of a civics lesson,
if not of a subversive and anti‑authoritarian call. Precisely there, it seems, lie the secrets
of the appeal that so many American commercial messages have had, domestically as well
as  abroad.  Exploring  frontiers  of  freedom,  of  children  rebelling  against  parental
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authority, of sexual freedom, of freedom in matters of taste and in styles of behavior,
American consumer goods have been instruments of political and cultural education, if
not of emancipation. Generation upon generation of youngsters, growing up in a variety
of settings in Europe, West and East of the Iron Curtain, have vicariously enjoyed the
pleasures of cultural alternatives conjured up in commercial vignettes. Simple items like
a pair of blue jeans, Coca‑Cola, a cigarette brand, thus acquired an added value which
helped these younger generations to give expression to an identity all their own. They
have been using American cultural language and have made American cultural codes
their own. To that extent they have become Americanized. To the extent, though, that
they  have  “done  their  own thing,”  while  drawing  on  American  cultural  repertoires,
Americanization  is  no  longer  the  proper  word  for  describing  what  has  gone  on.  If
anything, those at the receiving end of American mass culture have adapted it to make it
serve their own ends.  They have woven it  into a cultural  language,  whose grammar,
syntax  and  semantics—metaphorically  speaking—would  still  recognizably  be  French,
Italian, or Czech. All that the recipients have done is make new statements in such a
language.
37 There are more instances of such recontextualization. Surrounded as we are by jingles,
posters, neon signs, and billboards, all trying to convey their commercial exhortations,
we all at one point or another ironically recycle their repertoires; we quote slogans while
bending their meaning; we mimic voices and faces familiar from radio and television. We
weave them into our conversations, precisely because they are shared repertoires. Used
in this way, two things happen. International repertoires become national, in the sense
that they are given a particular twist in conversations, acquiring their new meanings only
in particular national and linguistic settings. Secondly, commercial messages stop being
commercial.  A  de‑commodification  takes  place  in  the  sense  that  the  point  of  the
conversation is no longer a piece of merchandise or a specific economic transaction. In
this ironic recycling of our commercial culture we become its masters rather than its
slaves.
38 Many things have happened along the way since American mass culture started traveling
abroad.  American icons may have become the staple  of  a  visual  lingua franca that  is
understood anywhere in the world, yet their use can no longer be dictated solely from
America.
39 For one thing, as we saw before, it is clear that European commercials made for European
products may draw on semiotic repertoires initially developed in and transmitted from
America. Yet, in a creolizing freedom not unlike America’s modularizing cast of mind,
Europeans in their  turn now freely re‑arrange and recombine the bits  and pieces of
American culture. They care little about authenticity. T‑shirts produced in Europe are as
likely to say “New York Lions” as they are “New York Giants.”8 What is more, American
brand names, as free‑floating signifiers, may even be de‑commodified and turned into
carriers of a message that is no longer commercial at all. Admittedly, the T‑shirts, leather
jackets  and baseball  caps,  sporting  the  hallowed names  of  Harley  Davidson,  Nike  or
Coca‑Cola, still have to be bought. Yet what one pays is the price of admission into a
world of symbols shared by an international youth culture. Boys or girls with the word
Coca‑Cola on their T‑shirts are not the unpaid peddlers of American merchandise. Quite
the  contrary.  They have transcended such trite  connotations  and restored American
icons to their pure semiotic state of messages of pleasure and freedom. Within this global
youth culture,  the  icons  youngsters  carry  are  like  the  symbol  of  the  fish  that  early
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Christians drew in the sand as a code of recognition. They are the members of a new
International,  geared  to  a  post‑modern  world  of  consumerism  rather  than  an  early
modern one centered on values of production.
40 There are many ironies here. What is often held against the emerging international mass,
or pop culture, is precisely its international, if not cosmopolitan character. Clearly, this a
case of double standards. At the level of high culture, most clearly in its modernist phase,
there has always been the dream of transcending the local, the provincial, the national, or
in social terms, to transgress the narrow bounds of the bourgeois world, and to enter a
realm  that  was  nothing  if  not  international:  the  transcendence  lay  in  being  truly
“European,” or “cosmopolitan.” But clearly what is good at the level of high culture is
seen as a threat when a similar process of internationalization occurs at the level of mass
culture. Then, all of a sudden, the defense is not in terms of high versus low, as one might
have expected, but in terms of national cultures and national identities imperiled by an
emerging international mass culture. There is a further irony in this construction of the
conflict,  contrasting  an  emerging  global  culture  seen  as  homogenizing  to  national
cultures seen as havens of  cultural  diversity.  In the real  world,  of  course,  things are
different. There may be a hierarchy of taste cultures, yet it is not a matter of higher taste
cultures  being  the  more  national  in  orientation.  It  seems  to  be  the  case  that  this
hierarchy of  taste cultures is  itself  transnational,  that indeed there are international
audiences who at the high end all appreciate Beethoven and Bartok, or at the low end all
fancy Madonna or Prince. Yet in a replay of much older elitist tirades against low culture,
advocates of high art see only endless diversity where their own taste is concerned, and
sheer vulgar homogeneity at the level of mass culture. They have no sense of the variety
of tastes and styles, of endless change and renewal in mass culture, simply because it all
occurs far beyond their ken.
41 Allow  me  one  final  observation.  From  the  point  of  view  of  American  mass  culture
traveling abroad, in many cases the exploration of cultural frontiers is taken to more
radical lengths than anything one might see in America. Whereas sexual joy and freedom
are merely hinted at in American commercials, where Coca‑Cola at best holds the promise
of more intimate intercourse in its vignettes of rapturous boys and girls, on the beach, in
boats,  floating  down  rivers,  European  posters  and  TV  commercials  often  are  more
explicit. 
42 There is  a brooding,  erotic Italian wallposter of  a macho guy,  bare‑chested,  standing
astride a scantily clad, sexually aroused young woman crouched between his legs.
Photograph by the author
43 She wears a crown reminiscent of the Statue of Liberty, there is an American flag. The
commercial is for the one piece of clothing on the man’s body, his pair of blue jeans.
Similarly, in the Netherlands, in a poster and TV campaign sponsored by the government,
inviting (in small print) people to become organ donors and to wear a donor codicil, we
see a young couple making love, both naked, she sitting on his lap, curving backwards in
rapture. The text,  in large print,  reads: “Give your heart a new lease on life.” Pasted
across  the  country,  on  railway  platforms,  on  bus  stops,  the  poster  must  have  made
visiting Americans bashfully turn their heads away. To them the campaign would not
appear as the outcome of a process of Americanization taken a few daring steps further.
Nor  for  that  matter  would  another  poster  campaign,  again  sponsored  by  the  Dutch
government, on behalf of safe sex. Graphically, for everyone to see, couples are shown,
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taking showers or engaged in similar forms of foreplay. Shocking stuff indeed, but nor is
this  all.  Yet  another  frontier  is  being explored,  if  not  crossed:  in  addition to  hetero
couples, gay couples are shown.
44 Admittedly, these poster campaigns no longer convey commercial messages, although in
fact the Dutch government, in order to get its messages across, has adopted advertising
techniques and in fact  uses advertising billboards,  rented,  one assumes,  at  the going
market  rate.  In  a  sense  we have  come  full  circle.  Where  the  Hoover  Company
advertisement drew on republican language to claim the freedom of the advertiser, we
now see advertising space being reclaimed for statements pro bono publico. If democracy is
a marketplace, it has become inseparable from the economic market. It is in fact one
indivisible and noisy place with cries and calls vying for the public’s attention, echoing
back  and  forth.  The  perfect  illustration  of  this  was  being  pasted  all  across  the
Netherlands, in January 1995. A huge poster, produced by a Dutch advertising agency
solely for the Dutch market, advertised the Levi’s 508, yet playfully drew on American
political language for its commercial message.
Photograph by the author
45 What the poster shows is the lower part of a half‑nude male torso, covered from the waist
down by a pair of jeans. Intertextuality abounds. The poster was reminiscent of famous
album covers such as the Rolling Stones’ Sticky Fingers, designed by Andy Warhol, or the
Bruce Springsteen album Born in the USA. But there is more. Playing on the classic version
of  the  Four  Freedoms the  poster  rephrased them as  follows:  freedom of  expression,
freedom of thought, freedom of choice, and—Levi's 508—freedom of movement. The third
freedom,  as  we  have  seen,  already  makes  the  transition  from  the  political  to  the
commercial; the fourth, political though it may sound, is meant to convey the greater
room of movement provided by the baggier cut of the 508. The picture illustrates the
point by showing the unmistakable bulge of a male member in full  erection, casually
touched  by  the  hand  of  its  owner.  Clearly,  the  semiotics  of  American  commercial
strategies have been taken to lengths, so to speak, that are inconceivable in America.
America  may have  been less  embarrassed  in  exploring the  continuities  between the
political and the commercial, Europe later on may have been more daring in its pursuit of
happiness, graphically advertising it all across Europe’s public space.9
46 For indeed, as European examples, from the political and the economic market place,
serve to illustrate, the logic of a choice of freedom knows no bounds, once set free from
controlling American standards of taste and decency. As is a lingua franca’s wont, it moves
in a realm of free creolization, where the controlling authority of a mother culture no
longer holds. Americanization then should be the story of an American cultural language
traveling and of other people acquiring that language. What they actually say in it, is a
different story altogether.
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